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INTRODUCTION 
“Let the doctor tell me I shall die unless I do so-and-so; 
but whether life is worth having on those terms is no more 
a question for him than for any other man.”1 
C.S. Lewis 
Recent controversial cases illuminate the global discrepancies in national 
standards applied for medical decision-making involving young children. 
This is especially true of end-of-life treatment decisions where the child
is not in a position to self-advocate, due to age or disability. Countries 
have different answers as to whether the guardian or the state should make
the ultimate treatment decision for a child, and in particular the decision 
to terminate treatment or withdraw life-saving measures. This underlies 
the broader legal issue of patient autonomy, and whether the child belongs 
to the state or the guardian2 for purposes of medical decision-making. 
Nations also have defined disability differently and have given different 
meanings to the subjective concept of quality of life, which leads to different
patients’ rights policies. This diversity of values and circumstances clearly
have an effect on the type of quality of life considered intolerable, and 
therefore directly influence medical decision-making, particularly at the
end of life. Unsurprisingly, these treatment decisions are exceptionally
important because of the life and death reality. This importance drives a 
heightened need to adopt a comprehensive standard that preserves the 
autonomy of patients and their guardians, while accounting for the level 
of suffering of the patients and the possibility of survival. 
Currently, the “best interest” standard is widely accepted on a quasi-
global level. Under this standard, courts look at various factors to determine 
what is in the best interest of the patient, even if it is contrary to the wishes of 
the patient or the patient’s guardians. To retain decision-making authority 
1. C.S. Lewis, Willing Slaves of the Welfare State, THE BSERVER
Bovard, States are right to act toward preventing an Alfie 
O , July 20, 1958. 
2. See, e.g., Rachel 
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when children are concerned, guardians must establish that continuing
(or discontinuing) treatment is in the best interest of the child, which often
results in the guardians being pitted against the advice of medical 
professionals. Consequently, losing decision-making authority leads to
the usurping of the paternal role. Additionally, whether the “best interest” 
standard does what it claims to do—act in the best interest of the child— 
is highly debated, particularly when the end result goes against the ethos
of those who know the child best. 
This Comment argues that shifting the burden of proof from the patients’ 
guardians to the state and adopting an “extreme suffering” test will allow 
guardians to exercise their autonomy while still accounting for the overall
interests of the patient. Under this test, the guardians retain decision-
making power and ultimately formulate a treatment plan they believe is in
the best interest of the child. The state will only have the authority to step
in when the treatment chosen by the parents will certainly (or as medically 
certainly as it can be) lead to extreme pain for the patient, with no possibility
that the suffering will subside. At that point, the state will step in. 
The issue of end-of-life treatment for young children has gained new 
traction in the United States in the weeks just prior to this writing. A tense 
legal battle is currently raging in Texas over the treatment of Tinslee Lewis, 
a baby girl with a rare heart defect.3 Tinslee’s mother is petitioning the courts
to keep her on life support until she can find a physician who will perform a 
tracheotomy on Tinslee.4 Tinslee’s current healthcare providers are
countering that Tinslee’s condition is irreversible and she should be 
removed from life support.5 
The Comment will compare the laws governing end-of-life care for 
minors in the United Kingdom, Israel, Australia, and the United States; it
will explore cases like Tinslee’s that have illustrated the disagreements
between guardians and physicians over end-of-life treatment decisions for
critically ill children, and it will focus on two prominent British cases. The
Comment will examine the historical influences and motivations of the 
diverse legal schemes and how different legal systems address the relevant
issues. It will conclude by proposing a model standard. 
Parts I and II will explore the two pivotal concerns in determining who 
should make the decision for a child’s end-of-life treatment. Part I will 
3. See infra Section III.C. (discussing Tinslee’s case and advance directives). 
4. Id.
 5. Id. 
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explain the best interest test and will consider two cases of critically ill
children and how the laws led to the results in each case. Part II will 
describe the role of autonomy in medical decisions generally, and how the 
autonomy of the guardians in cases involving minor children should 
remain intact except for the most extreme cases. Part III will discuss other 
considerations in determining end-of-life treatment, including the role of 
mediation and alternatives to court rulings, and legislature on experimental
treatment, advance directives, and do-not-resuscitate orders. Part IV will 
propose a legal solution and a Model Code, which will formulate a test 
based on the patient’s “extreme suffering” that gives deference to guardian 
autonomy. Part IV will also review the negative implications of the best
interest test on disability rights. The Comment will culminate with an
illustration of how the two cases discussed in Part I would have resulted 
in different outcomes had the Model Code been used; it also theorizes how 
an ongoing case would be decided under the Model Code. 
I. BEST INTEREST TEST 
The first major prong to consider in determining how to proceed with a 
critically ill child’s treatment is that child’s “best interest.”6 The best 
interest standard is an ethical requirement calling for caregivers to provide 
medical treatment in good faith and by placing the caregiver’s assessment
of the person’s best interests above their own.7 This standard particularly
applies to the care of dependent individuals such as infants or small 
children whose age prevents them from making decisions on their own.8 
In the more legal sense, the best interest test has emerged as a means to
resolve disputes between parties over the treatment for a young patient 
when the parties take the dispute to court. However, while this standard 
may be beneficial in resolving other controversies involving children, 
such as custody disputes, it has not proved an overall effective means of 
minimizing harm when assessing whether a child should receive treatment. 
The cases of Charlie Gard and Alfie Evans demonstrate that while this 
standard is favored by courts in United Kingdom (UK),9 the outcomes 
reached by relying on it often bring devastating consequences. 
6. THE FREE DICTIONARY, https://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/best+
interest+standard [https://perma.cc/VP4B-FMYJ] (last visited Mar. 8, 2020). 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. See infra Section I.A. (discussing the cases of Charlie Gard and Alfie Evans). 
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A. United Kingdom 
According to the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health, when 
“treatment is unable or unlikely to prolong life significantly, it may not be
in the child’s best interest to provide it.”10 Omitting treatment may also 
be appropriate “where treatment may be able to prolong life significantly
but will not alleviate the burdens associated with illness or treatment itself.”11 
The Royal College has issued guidelines which identify three situations
where medical providers can consider limiting treatment: (1) when life is
limited in duration; (2) when life is limited in quality; and (3) when there 
is informed competent refusal of treatment.12 
While UK courts now adhere to this “best interest” standard, this is 
a shift from the historical position of UK law. At common law, fathers
possessed sole custody of and decision-making for their children.13 A 
father could enforce his right to the custody of his child through a writ of 
habeas corpus,14 which resulted in near-absolute paternal rights.15 This 
absoluteness shifted in 1839 with the Custody of Infants Act16 creating some 
maternal custody rights,17 and subsequent legislature and reliance on the
best interest test that have since considerably lessened parental rights.18 
Specifically, in 1891, the Custody of Children Act clarified that parental 
rights are not absolute.19 The Guardianship of Infants Act followed in 
1925, later to be replaced by the Children Act 1989 (the 1989 Act), which 
10. Vic Larcher et al., Making Decisions to Limit Treatment in Life-Limiting and 
Life-Threatening Conditions in Children: A Framework for Practice, 100 ARCHIVES OF 
DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD s13 (2015) (emphasis added), https://adc.bmj.com/content/archdischild/
100/Suppl_2/s1.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/92RK-H85Q]. 
11. Id. at s4. 
12. Id. 
13. See, e.g., Sarah Abramowicz, Note, English Child Custody Law, 1660–1839: The
Origins of Judicial Intervention in Parental Custody, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1344 (1999). 
14. The Habeas Corpus Act was enacted by the Parliament in 1679 and remains in
force. Habeas Corpus Act 1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 2 (Eng. and Wales). It ensures that an 
individual cannot be imprisoned unlawfully. Literally translated, “habeas corpus” means
“you may have the body.” Learning Timelines: Sources from History, Habeas Corpus Act 
1679, BRITISH LIBRARY, http://www.bl.uk/learning/timeline/item104236.html [https://perma.cc/ 
EDN98-37NJ] (last visited Mar. 14, 2020). 
15. Abramowicz, supra note 13, at 1344. 
16.  Custody of Infants Act 1839, 2 & 3 Vict., c. 54 (Eng.). 
17. Id. 
18. In the matter of Alfie Evans No.2 [2018] EWHC (Fam) 308 (appeal refused by
UKSC) (Eng.).
19.  Custody of Children Act 1981, 54–55 Vic., c. 3 (Eng.). 
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established that a child’s best interest is the paramount consideration when 
any question relating to the child comes before the courts.20 The best 
interest test as articulated by the 1989 Act reflects the globally recognized
standard,21 and UK courts consistently abide by it, as shown in the case of 
baby Charlie Gard.22 
1. Charlie Gard 
Charlie Gard was born full term on August 4, 2016 in England.23 At 
birth, he appeared “perfectly healthy,”24 but within a month, his parents
noticed he could not lift his head or support himself.25 By October of 2016,26 
Charlie was admitted to Great Ormond Street Hospital (Great Ormond) in 
London, where physicians diagnosed him with an exceptionally rare genetic 
condition.27 Physicians deemed his prognosis bleak,28 and Charlie soon 
lost the ability to move his arms and legs and to open his eyes.29 
After ceaseless research and consultation with physicians from across 
the world, Charlie’s parents learned of an experimental, non-invasive 
treatment30 that had prior success with another syndrome similar to Charlie’s 
20. Section 31(2) of the 1989 Act also discusses the “significant harm” to the child
as a threshold matter in determining whether a court can consider whether to make a care 
or supervision order. Children Act 1989, c. 41, § 31(2) (Eng.); Significant harm, THOMSON 
REUTERS, https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/8-538-0246?transitionType=Default&
contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&comp=pluk&bhcp=1 (last visited Mar. 27, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/7GUF-93ER].
21.  Justice Committee, Operation on the Family Courts, 2011, HC 518-I ¶ 47. 
22. Id. at 48. 
23. Timeline: Charlie Gard and his parents’ legal battle to save him, THE GUARDIAN 
(July 28, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jul/24/timeline-charlie-gard-
and-his-parents-legal-battle-to-save-him [https://perma.cc/4XLM-TD4Z] [hereinafter Charlie 
Gard Timeline].
24. Cory Franklin, The lesson everyone missed in the Charlie Gard story, WASH. 
EXAMINER (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/the-lesson-everyone-
missed-in-the-charlie-gard-story [https://perma.cc/E7HG-KHQJ]. 
25. Charlie Gard Timeline, supra note 23. 
26. Id. 
27. Charlie was diagnosed with encephalomyopathic mitochondrial DNA depletion 
syndrome. Charlie Gard: The story of his parents’ legal fight, BBC (July 27, 2017), https://
www.bbc.com/news/health-40554462 [https://perma.cc/GYL6-EYUV] [hereinafter Charlie 
Gard Story]; Rosalyn Broad, Comment, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: Gard v. United 
Kingdom: Does the State Know Best?, 26 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 405 (2018); Charlie 
Gard Timeline, supra note 23. 
28. Charlie Gard Story, supra note 27. 
29. Charlie Gard Timeline, supra note 23; Broad, supra note 27. 
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condition.31 Charlie’s parents consulted a physician from Columbia University 
Medical Center in the United States,32 who confirmed that Charlie could 
be treated in the United States if his parents financed the treatment.33 By
January of 2017, a public crowdfunding page raised approximately 1.3
million pounds (1.68 million dollars) for Charlie’s treatment.34 
The British physicians opposed the idea of Charlie receiving experimental
treatment in the United States and argued that Charlie’s life support 
should be removed to allow him to die with “dignity.”35  As Charlie was 
being evaluated for this treatment option, he suffered numerous seizures 
which caused severe damage to his brain,36 heart, liver, and kidneys.37 
Despite the severity of the damage, physicians at Great Ormond could not 
definitively ascertain whether Charlie experienced pain.38 
In March of 2017, despite the objections of Charlie’s parents, Great 
Ormond applied to the Family Division of the High Court for an order to
halt Charlie’s treatment.39 Great Ormond presented experts who testified 
that there could be no reversal of Charlie’s brain damage, even with 
treatment.40 The judge agreed with the experts and granted the order on 
31.  Kate Samuelson, What to Know About Charlie Gard, the Terminally Ill Baby 
Trump Wants to Help, TIME (July 3, 2017), https://time.com/4843746/president-trump-
pope-francis-charlie-gard/ [https://perma.cc/V655-S8Y9].
 32. Debra Goldschmidt & Richard Greene, British baby Charlie Gard to be evaluated 
by US doctor, CNN (July 17, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/07/14/health/charlie-
gard-us-doctor-bn/index.html [https://perma.cc/VA7B-EEAD]. 
33. Charlie Gard Story, supra note 27. 
34. Charlie’s parents publicly opined their strong belief that Charlie should be given
the opportunity to try the medications because he has “literally nothing to lose but potentially a
healthier, happier life to gain.” Samuelson, supra note 31. 
35. Gard v. United Kingdom, App. No. 39793/17, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2, 28 (2017); Charlie 
Gard Story, supra note 27. 
36. Gard v. UK, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2, 28; Broad, supra note 27; Charlie Gard Story, 
supra note 27. 
37. Charlie Gard Story, supra note 27. 
38. Id. 
39. Charlie Gard Timeline, supra note 23. 
40. Gard v. UK, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2, 28; Broad, supra note 27; Charlie Gard Story, 
supra note 27. 
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April 11, citing Wyatt v. Portsmouth NHS Trust41 in his decision.42 Charlie’s 
parents appealed,43 but the Court of Appeal dismissed their petition less 
than three weeks later.44 The British Supreme Court affirmed the first 
decision, ruling that it would be against Charlie’s best interest to take him 
to the United States to receive treatment without a real prospect of 
improvement.45 
Following the effective termination of parental autonomy over Charlie’s 
treatment, Charlie’s parents applied for an order to the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR).46 The parents argued that not only had state 
authorities violated their positive obligations to protect life, but that their 
own parental rights had been disproportionately affected in violation of 
Articles 6 and 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).47 
In particular, Charlie’s parents maintained that applying a “best interest”
test instead of a “significant harm” test permitted unjust interference in 
their parental rights, and that the High Court had erred by relying on the
“best interest” test alone.48 
Charlie’s parents sought to distinguish between two categories of cases 
relating to children’s treatment decisions.49 The first category involved 
parents who opposed the treatment physicians proposed but did not have 
a viable alternative to present to the court, and the second category of cases
involved parents who did have an alternate treatment option.50 Charlie’s 
parents’ case fell into the latter category because they proposed a treatment 
plan and had the means to pay for it.51 
Charlie’s parents also advocated that parental autonomy in a child’s 
medical decisions should only be superseded if the parents’ proposed
treatment is likely to cause the child “significant harm.”52 Great Ormond, 
41. Charlotte Wyatt was born prematurely in October of 2003, weighing only one 
pound, and with serious damage to her brain, lungs, and kidneys. Despite medical opinion
that Charlotte had no prospect of normal development or independence, Charlotte’s parents
fought in court to require physicians to provide her with ventilation. Wyatt v. Portsmouth




42. Great Ormond Street Hospital for Children NHS Foundation v. Yates and Others, 
[2017] EWHC 972 (Fam)13, [2018] 1 All ER 569 (Eng.); Broad, supra note 27. 
43. Charlie Gard Timeline, supra note 23. 
44. Id. 
45.  In the Matter of Charlie Gard [2017] UKSC [5], [17] (Eng.). 
46. See Gard v. United Kingdom, App. No. 39793/17, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2017). 
47. Id. at 15. 
48. Id. at 6–7, 15. 
49. Id. at 6. 
50. Id.
 51. Id. 
52. There is no statutory definition of significant harm, but the Children Act 1989
provides some guidance. Under Section 31(9), in determining whether the harm to the child’s 
health is significant, the child’s health and development must be compared to that of a 
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the hospital, contended that the treatment proposed by Charlie’s parents 
was not in Charlie’s best interest, even though there was no evidence that 
the intended treatment would have an adverse effect on Charlie.53 Charlie’s 
parents countered that Great Ormond acted outside of its power as a public 
authority when it initially applied to prevent treatment it did not intend to 
provide, and therefore the court had no jurisdiction to uphold Great 
Ormond’s position.54 
The ECtHR dismissed Charlie’s parents’ complaint.55 It held that the 
UK’s regulatory framework, which requires physicians to apply to the 
courts in uncertain cases, was compatible with Article 2 of the ECHR.56 
Additionally, interference with parental rights in accordance with the law
was permissive as it pursued a legitimate end that protected the interests 
of the child.57 The ECtHR agreed with Great Ormond in applying the best
interest test, and clarified that the basis for that test was in broad international 
consensus.58 After the decision, Great Ormond announced there was “no 
rush” to change Charlie’s treatment, and there would be “careful planning 
and discussion,” albeit without the consent of Charlie’s parents.59 
Charlie’s parents were seemingly out of available legal avenues60 to 
regain autonomy over Charlie’s treatment plan when the case garnered 
international attention.61 Pope Francis called for Charlie’s parents to be
allowed to “accompany and treat their child until the end,”62 and the Vatican’s 
children’s hospital, Bambino Gesu, offered to treat Charlie.63 The President 
of the United States, Donald Trump, tweeted his support for Charlie’s family 
and contacted the physician at Columbia University who had previously 
“reasonable” child. Children Act 1989, c. 41, § 31(9) (Eng.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/1989/41/section/31 [https://perma.cc/NR8W-5HM7].
53.  Gard v. UK, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2, 7 (2017). 
54. Id. at 6. 
55. Id. at 20. 
56. Id. at 2, 28 (2017); Charlie Gard Timeline, supra note 23; Broad, supra note 27, 
at 411. 
57.  Gard v. UK, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2, 15 (2017). 
58. Id. at 25. 
59. Charlie Gard Timeline, supra note 23. 
60. Id.
 61. See Emma Cave & Emma Nottingham, Who Knows Best (Interests)? The Case of 
Charlie Gard, 26 MED. L. REV. 500, 513 (2018). 




confirmed that Charlie could be treated in the United States.64 The physician,
along with other medical experts, co-signed a letter suggesting that unpublished
data showed therapy could improve Charlie’s brain condition.65 
On July 10, 2017, Charlie’s parents returned to the High Court 
requesting review of the case66 in light of the new evidence relating to the 
potential treatment for Charlie’s condition. Under the initial ruling,
Charlie was prohibited from being transferred despite available medical
alternatives.67 The following week, a Columbia University physician traveled
to London to examine Charlie and to consult with Great Ormond physicians.68 
On July 17, the physician testified in court that the treatment option 
championed by Charlie’s parents had a ten percent success rate, and that
Charlie’s electroencephalogram (EEG)69 showed “disorganization of 
brain activity [but] not major structural brain damage.”70 In response, a
lawyer from Great Ormond blindsided Charlie’s parents by representing 
the results of a new scan of Charlie’s brain to the court before Charlie’s 
parents received it.71 
The legal battles wore on Charlie’s family, and on July 24, one day
before the High Court was expected to rule, Charlie’s parents announced
they were ending the legal fight over Charlie’s treatment because “time 
ha[d] run out.”72 The following day, Charlie’s mother returned to court to 
beseech the judge to allow Charlie to spend his final days at home.73 Great 
64. Jessica Glenza, How Charlie Gard Captured Trump’s Attention and Animated 
Pro-Life Groups, THE GUARDIAN (July 26, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/
2017/jul/26/charlie-gard-us-pro-life-rightwing-ethics [https://perma.cc/V33S-24A5].
65. The doctor conceded that treatment would ideally be tested on mice first but 
there was no time for such trial in Charlie’s case. Charlie Gard has 10% chance of 
improvement, US doctor claims, BBC NEWS (July 13, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/
uk-england-london-40593286 [https://perma.cc/T78V-4XA5].
66. Charlie Gard Timeline, supra note 23. 
67.  Great Ormond Street Hospital for Children NHS Foundation v. Yates and Others
[2017] EWHC 1909 (Fam) 13, (Eng.). 
68. Charlie Gard Timeline, supra note 23. 
69. An EEG, or electroencephalogram, is a test that records the electrical signals of the 
brain. What is an EEG (Electroencephalogram)?, WEBMD, https://www.webmd.com/ epilepsy/ 
guide/electroencephalogram-eeg  [https://perma.cc/2EDQ-HDC7] (last updated July 20, 2019). 
70. Haroon Siddique, Charlie Gard’s Father in Court Outburst After Scan Results 




 72. Crux Staff, Parents of Charlie Gard Drop Legal Fight, Saying ‘Time has Run Out’, 
CRUX (July 24, 2017), https://cruxnow.com/global-church/2017/07/parents-charlie-gard-
drop-legal-fight-saying-time-run/ [https://perma.cc/PR6L-4N77]. 
73. Michael Edison Hayden, Charlie Gard’s Family Asks Court to Let the Boy Come 
Home to Die, ABC NEWS (July 25, 2017), https://abcnews.go.com/International/charlie-
gards-family-asks-court-boy-home-die/story?id=48834464[https://perma.cc/H29C-2LT9]. 
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Ormond opposed the request.74 The judge denied the request, stating the
only two options for Charlie were to remain at the hospital or enter 
hospice.75 Charlie’s parents indicated they wanted to privately fund hospice 
treatment, and Great Ormond fought them on yet this other request.76 The 
judge ruled that Charlie should be taken into hospice by noon of the 
following day if the parties could not come to an agreement.77 
Charlie was transferred to hospice on July 27, 2017, as planned by the 
court.78 The plan dictated that life support would be withdrawn shortly
after the transfer so as to avoid “the risk of an unplanned and chaotic end
to Charlie’s life.”79 In an emotional statement, Charlie’s mother noted that 
Great Ormond “denied [them] of [their] final wish.”80 Charlie passed
away the following day, just weeks before his first birthday.81 
The court in Charlie’s case ruled using the “best interest” test but under 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, parents have the right to 
determine what is in the best interest of their child.82 In its judgment, the
High Court explained how the Custody of Children Act 189183 severely
qualified this parental right by granting courts the right to protect minors 
from neglectful or abusive parents.84 Subsequent Acts of Parliament85 
established that a child’s best interest is the principal consideration for any 
74. Haroon Siddique, Charlie Gard: Judge to Decide on Parent’s ‘Last Wish’ that 
Son Can Die at Home, THE GUARDIAN (July 26, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2017/jul/25/charlie-gard-connie-yates-asks-court-die-at-home [https://perma.cc/66UM-
NX22].
75.  Great Ormond Street Hospital for Children NHS Foundation v. Yates and Others
[2017] EWHC 1909 (Fam) [13], [2018] 1 All ER 569. 
76. Id. 
 77. Natasha Hammond-Browning, When Doctors and Parents Don’t Agree: The Story 
of Charlie Gard, 14 J. OF BIOETHICAL INQUIRY 461 (2017). 
78. Charlie Gard Timeline, supra note 23. 
79. Great Ormond Street Hospital for Children NHS Foundation v. Yates and 
Others, at [3]; Charlie Gard Timeline, supra note 23. 
80. Charlie Gard Timeline, supra note 23. 
81. Id. 
82. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). 
83.  Custody of Children Act 1891, 54 & 55 Vict., c. 3, § 1 (Eng.). 
 84. Rod Dreher, About Alfie Evans, THE AM. CONSERVATIVE (Apr. 28, 2018), 
https://www.theamericanconservative.com/dreher/about-alfie-evans-britain-euthanasia/
[https://perma.cc/PG9Y-6EDJ].
85. Guardianship of Infant Acts 1925, 15 & 16 Geo.V, c. 45 (Eng.), https://www.
swarb.co.uk/acts/1925Guardianship_of_InfantsAct.shtml [https://perma.cc/X5ZD-CGLS]
(Eng.); Children Act 1989, c. 41, § 41 (Eng.). 
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question relating to the child that comes before the courts.86 The practical
effect of the legal change from absolute to qualified parental rights is that
the state ultimately exercises parental power over the child while leaving 
that right to the actual parents on a day-to-day basis. 
a. The European Convention on Human Rights 
In their appeal, Charlie’s parents brought claims under Articles 2 and 8
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).87 The ECHR and the ECtHR stem from 
the Council of Europe, formed after World War II,88 to promote democracy 
in Europe.89 The Council of Europe adopted the ECHR in 195090 to secure 
civil and political rights,91 and the Council of Europe established the 
ECtHR to oversee the ECHR’s implementation. The ECHR sets forth 
several fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to life, the 
right to liberty and security, and the right to respect for private and family 
life.92 At the request of the Council of Europe,93 the ECtHR may give
advisory opinions concerning the interpretation of the ECHR and interpret 
86.  Children Act 1989, c. 41, § 41 (Eng.). 
87. Hammond-Browning, supra note 77, at 464. 
88. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 005 [The ECHR]; see also The European Convention on Human 
Rights, THE BRIT. INST. OF HUM. RTS., https://www.bihr.org.uk/theconvention [https:// 
perma.cc/JW4F-GGMS] (last visited Feb. 28, 2020). 
89. Do not get confused, Council of Europe, https://www.coe.int/en/web/about-
us/do-not-get-confused?desktop=true [https://perma.cc/3A9D-GVT9]; Marc Ernest Trigilio,
Note, The Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine: Allowing Medical Treatment 
and Research without Consent on Persons Unable to Give Informed Consent, 22 SUFFOLK 
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 641 (1999) (noting how the European Convention of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and its European human rights law derive in part
from addressing the atrocity of the Holocaust, which increased awareness of violations of
the rights and dignity of the human being, particularly in the areas of medical treatment 
and research); Winston Churchill, Address at the Congress of Europe in The Hague (May 
7, 1948) (calling for a “Charter of Human Rights” to be “guarded by freedom and sustained 
by law” which ensured “people owned the government, and not the government the people” in
the aftermath of World War II). 
90. The ECHR, supra note 88. 
91.  Council of Europe, supra note 89. 
92. The ECHR, supra note 88, at arts. 2, 5, 8. 
93. Council of Europe, supra note 89. The two main governing bodies in Europe 
are the Council of Europe and the European Union. The Council of Europe is an international 
organization comprising of forty-seven European countries and focuses on protection of 
human rights and the rule of law in Europe. The European Union has twenty-eight members 
that have delegated some of their sovereignty so that “decisions on specific matters of joint 
interest can be made democratically at the European level.” There is some interplay between
the two authorities as no country has ever joined the European Union without first belonging to
the Council of Europe. Id. 
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judgments from the courts of member states.94 The ECtHR has the authority to 
issue binding judgments on individuals95 or member states to the ECHR96 
and it creates law through its decisions.97 
Article 34 of the ECHR allows the ECtHR to receive applications from 
any individual who claims to be the victim of a violation of the rights set 
forth in the Convention,98 which is how Charlie’s parents had standing to 
bring their claim. The ECtHR has examined general principles regarding 
treatment for terminally ill patients,99 specifically addressing ECHR Article 
2 complaints (like the one brought by Charlie’s parents).100 Article 2 of 
the ECHR provides that “everyone’s right to life shall be protected by 
law.”101 The ECtHR has held that Article 2 cannot be interpreted to require
access to experimental or unauthorized treatment for terminally ill individuals
or that such treatment must be regulated in a particular way.102 
Charlie’s parents also brought a claim under Article 8, which states that
“everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence” and protects against interference by public authorities 
with the exercise of the right to respect for private and family life “except 
such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society.”103 Until the passing of the Human Rights Act of 1998,104 the 
ECtHR was the only avenue for parties in the UK to demand their human 
rights. 
94. Guardianship of Infants Act 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 45 (Eng.); Children Act 
1989, c. 41, § 32 (Eng.).
95. The ECHR, supra note 88, at art. 19. 
96. The ECtHR is based in Strasbourg and has operated full-time since November
of 1998; Council of Europe, supra note 89. 
97. See RALPH FOLSOM, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN UNION L. 69 (2017). 
98. See The ECHR, supra note 88, at art. 34. 
99. Broad, supra note 27. 
100. In Hristozov v. Bulgaria, the ECtHR addressed a complaint regarding Bulgaria’s 
denial of access to an experimental treatment for terminally ill patients. Bulgaria denied 
access because the product was not yet licensed, which was in violation of Bulgaria’s
regulations. The applicants’ complaint was that there was no way to obtain authorized use 
of experimental methods once they have exhausted all conventional methods of treatment 
and was therefore a violation of Article 2’s requirement that “everyone’s right to life shall 
be protected by law.” Hristozov v. Bulgaria, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 1–4 (2012). 
101. The ECHR, supra note 88, at art. 92. 
102. See generally id., at art. 2.
 103. Id. 
104. The Human Rights Act, Equality and Human Rights Commission (Nov. 15, 
2018), https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/human-rights/human-rights-act [https:// 
perma.cc/45WT-UXR6]. 
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b. The Human Rights Act of 1998 
In 1998, the UK passed the Human Rights Act which incorporated the 
fundamental rights and freedoms from the ECHR into domestic British 
law.105 The Human Rights Act has three main effects: (1) justice can be
sought in a domestic court instead of before the ECtHR; (2) all public 
bodies and other bodies carrying out public functions must respect individuals’ 
human rights; and (3) the Parliament and the British judiciary work to 
ensure legislative and interpretation are compatible with the ECHR and
the ECtHR’s decisions.106 In Charlie’s case, his parents initially sought
relief in accordance with the Human Rights Act, but when they ultimately
lost domestically, they turned to the ECtHR.107 
The justification for the 1891 Act was that parental rights should be 
transferred from brutal and neglectful parents to the state, but this was not
the situation in Charlie’s case: his parents made immense efforts to find 
other physicians and hospitals who would treat their baby, and no one 
could seriously say that they did not want to obtain the best outcome for 
him. The question naturally arises as to why, then, in a situation where the
parents or guardians are deemed to be seriously trying to do the best for 
their child, should physicians and courts step in and claim to be the paramount
evaluators of a child’s best interests. This question arose again in a case 
resulting in a similar outcome to Charlie’s, just a few months later, and that
involved continuing the treatment of a baby named Alfie Evans. 
2. Alfie Evans 
Alfie Evans was born a seemingly healthy baby on May 9, 2016,108 in 
Liverpool, England. In December of 2016, he was admitted into the pediatric
unit at Alder Hey Children’s Hospital (Alder Hey) following a series of
seizures.109 Over the next year, Alfie suffered additional seizures, as well 
as bi-lateral pneumonia and cardiac complications.110 By December of 
2017, hospital officials and Alfie’s parents disagreed on the appropriate 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Supra Section I.A1. 
108. Timeline: key events in the legal battle over Alfie Evans, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 
28, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/apr/28/alfie-evans-timeline-of-key-events 
[https://perma.cc/VW3K-RM43] [hereinafter Alfie Evans Timeline].
109. Id. 
110. Alfie Evans Timeline, supra note 108; Annabelle Timsit, The life and death of 
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course of treatment for the baby.111 Officials from Alder Hey announced 
publicly that they were liaising directly with Alfie’s family to resolve the 
conflict, but this claim was disputed by the family.112 
When a resolution could not be reached regarding Alfie’s treatment
plan, Alder Hey turned to the High Court and sought a declaration stating 
that continued ventilator support was not in Alfie’s best interest.113 The 
hospital took an additional step and requested that the court remove all
parental rights from Alfie’s family.114 A public hearing began on December 
19, 2017, in the family division of the High Court in London.115 Alder 
Hey argued that continuing life-saving treatment was not in Alfie’s best
interest.116 Alfie’s parents vehemently disagreed and pleaded for permission
to fly Alfie to Italy for him to receive the treatment that Alder Hey refused 
to provide.117 
Alfie’s parents were finally afforded the opportunity for mediation with 
Alder Hey in January, about the time Alfie slipped into a coma, but the
mediation ultimately proved unsuccessful.118 Another hearing began at the 
High Court in Liverpool the following month, during which lawyers for 
Alder Hey argued that further treatment for Alfie was unkind and inhumane, 
and one physician told the judge there was no hope for Alfie.119 Alfie’s 
parents expressed to the court their feeling that Alder Hey had given up 
on Alife.120 On February 20, 2018, the judge ruled in favor of Alder Hey,
accepting the medical evidence indicating that further treatment was futile, 
and that while every reasonable option should be explored, continuing treatment 
compromised Alfie’s “future dignity” and failed to respect his autonomy.121 
Alfie’s parents challenged the ruling in March of 2018 and three Court 
of Appeal judges began analyzing the case.122 Alfie’s parents requested a 
111. Alfie Evans Timeline, supra note 108. 
112. Id. 
113. Evans v. Alder Hey Children’s Foundation NHS Trust [2018] EWHC 308 (Fam) 
[1].




 118. Timsit, supra note 110. 
119. Alfie Evans Timeline, supra note 108; Timsit, supra note 110. 
120. See Alfie Evans Timeline, supra note 108 (statement of Tom Evans: Alfie “looks 
me in the eye and wants [my] help.”). 
121. Alfie Evans Timeline, supra note 108; Evans v. Alder Hey Children’s NHS Foundation 
Trust; Timsit, supra note 110. 
122. Alfie Evans Timeline, supra note 108. 
 547 
temporary stay in the appeal process for time to consult with lawyers, but 
the judges denied the request.123 On March 6 of 2018, the judges upheld 
the lower court decision.124 Alfie’s parents filed an appeal request with the
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom,125 and argued that Alder Hey
deprived Alfie of his liberty contrary to Article 5 of the ECHR.126 In 
deciding the request, the Supreme Court questioned whether a baby who
could not stay alive without artificial ventilation, nutrition, and hydration 
was deprived of his liberty and it reasoned that such treatment could only
be provided when in the “best interest” of the baby.127 The “deprivation
of liberty,” or the withdrawal of such treatment, was only lawful if it was 
in the child’s best interest.128 The Supreme Court ultimately found that a
person unable to move because of intensive care treatment to keep him 
alive is not deprived of his liberty within Article 5 of the ECHR.129 
Consequently, on March 20, the Supreme Court decided the case was not 
worth arguing and it denied the appeal.130 
After exhausting all legal options in the UK, Alfie’s parents brought
their case to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasburg.131 
Alfie’s parents implored the Court to recognize that they were being
unjustifiably discriminated against in their right to respect for family life 
under Article 8 of the ECHR.132 The ECtHR refused to examine any of
the issues related to Alfie’s future treatment and found no indication of a 
human rights violation.133 
On April 11, the British High Court judge endorsed an end-of-life care 
plan for Alfie, which was agreed to by Alder Hey, who would also administer 
it.134 Alfie’s father maintained he had a right to take his baby home.135 By
the following day, protestors gathered outside of Alder Hey in support of 
123. Id.
 124. Id. 
125. Alder Hey Children’s NHS Foundation Trust v. Evans [2018] EWHC 308 (Fam) 
FD17P00694 [ 26]; Timsit, supra note 110. 




 129. Id. 
130. Alfie Evans Timeline, supra note 108. 
131. Timsit, supra note 110. 
132. In re Alfie Evans No.2 [2018] EWHC (Fam) 308 (appeal refused by UKSC.) 
(Eng.).
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Alfie and his family.136 On April 16, Alfie’s parents, still fighting to take
their son to Italy for treatment, filed a habeas corpus application, arguing 
that Alfie was being wrongly detained at Alder Hey.137 The Court of Appeal 
in London ruled against them for the second time.138 The next day, Alfie’s
parents again asked the Supreme Court to consider their case.139 
In the meantime, international efforts commenced to save Alfie’s life.140 
The Italian government granted citizenship to Alfie to facilitate the treatment
he could receive at Bambino Gesu Hospital in Rome.141 The Italian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs explained that “the Italian government hopes that in 
this way, being an Italian citizen will enable the immediate transfer of the 
child to Italy.”142 The Italian government went so far as to arrange for a 
specially equipped plane from the Italian Defense Ministry to be on reserve
for Alfie and his parents to travel to Rome.143 On April 18, Alfie’s father
met with Pope Francis, who issued a personal appeal to British authorities 
to allow Alfie’s family to take him to Italy to seek further treatment; however, 
the Italian efforts were ultimately in vain.144 
On April 20, 2018, the British Supreme Court again ruled against 
Alfie’s parents and found that current law disallowed parents from using
the writ of habeas corpus “to acquire the custody of their child if this will
not be in his best interest.”145 The Supreme Court opined that there was
no evidence to find that the UK law differed from the laws of the ECHR 
136. Id.; Hundreds in Alfie Evans Alder Hey Hospital Protest, BBC (Apr. 13, 2018), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-merseyside-43746174 [https://perma.cc/M9MV-
AUTJ].
137. “The writ of habeas corpus issues as a right and requires the person having 
custody of the body of the subject person either to produce the body or to show good legal 
cause why the body should not be produced or released.” In the matter of Alfie Evans No.2
[2018] EWHC (Fam) 308 (appeal refused by UKSC) (Eng.).
138. Alfie Evans Timeline, supra note 108. 
139. Id. 
140. John Daniel Davidson, Alfie Evans’ Death Illustrates The Monstrous Logic Of 
The Welfare State, THE FEDERALIST (Apr. 30, 2018), http://thefederalist.com/ 2018/04/30/alfie-
evans-death-illustrates-monstrous-logic-welfare-state/ [https://perma.cc/43QU-2B8Z].
141. Sean O’Grady, Americans are using the Alfie Evans case to criticize the NHS 
are deluded about the realities of the US’s healthcare system, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 25, 
2018), https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/alfie-evans-nhs-healthcare-mike-huckabee-
usa-republicans-a8321601.html [https://perma.cc/T5K2-2YC5]; Timsit, supra note 110. 
142. Alfie Evans Timeline, supra note 108. 
143. O’Grady, supra note 141; Timsit, supra note 110. 
144. Davidson, supra note 140. 
145. In the matter of Alfie Evans No.2 [2018] EWHC (Fam) 308 (appeal refused by
UKSC) (Eng.). 
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or the EU in that respect.146 Once again, Alfie’s parents petitioned to the 
ECtHR for permission to take Alfie to Rome, but the ECtHR denied the 
application.147 
In yet another effort to regain decision-making power for their baby
before it was too late, Alfie’s parents submitted new requests privately via 
telephone to the High Court.148 The judge noted that while the Italian 
government’s grant of citizenship was “well-meaning,” it was “equally . . . 
misconceived,”149 and there was no basis to find that the Italian jurisdiction 
should supersede that of the High Court.150 The High Court dismissed the
final requests and Alfie’s parents were prohibited from taking him to
Italy.151 Police were stationed at Alder Hey to prevent Alfie from being 
rescued.152 One commentator noted that while the death penalty and euthanasia 
were both illegal in Britain, thirty law enforcement officers stood guard
outside of Alfie’s room to ensure his court-ordered death could proceed
uninterrupted.153 
On April 23, Alfie’s father publicly announced that Alder Hey physicians
removed Alfie’s life support.154 Although physicians indicated that he would 
suffocate within fifteen minutes without ventilation, Alfie continued to 
breathe unaided.155 Two days later, the judicial system denied Alfie’s
family’s final attempt to take Alfie to treatment abroad,156 citing concerns 
that movement would make Alfie vulnerable to possible infection.157 The 
following day, after months of conflict, Alfie’s parents pledged to work
with physicians to give Alfie “the dignity and comfort he needs.”158 Five 
days after physicians removed life support, Alfie passed away.159 Alfie’s 
parents revealed their grief in a statement: “Our baby boy grew his wings
tonight . . . We are heartbroken.”160 
146. Id.
 147. Alfie Evans Timeline, supra note 108. 
148. Id. 
149. Evans v. Alder Hey Children’s Foundation NHS Trust [2018] EWHC 308 (Fam). 
150. Mr. Justice Hayden further noted that the Italian application was disrespectful 
to principles of international comity, particularly in the context of vulnerable children. Id.
 151. O’Grady, supra note 141. 
152. Id.
 153. Ramesh Ponnuru, Why Aren’t U.S. Liberals Outraged About Alfie Evans? A 
British baby’s right to life should be clear to everyone, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 26, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-04-26/alfie-evans-case-should-provoke-
outrage-of-u-s-liberals.
154. Alfie Evans Timeline, supra note 108. 
155. Id. 
156. Id.
 157. Timsit, supra note 110. 
158. Alfie Evans Timeline, supra note 108. 
159. Id.
 160. Id. 
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B. Best Interest Discussion 
The best interest test has developed as a widely recognized standard for 
making end-of-life treatment decisions for minors, as evidenced by the
laws of the UK and Australia.161 A best interest determination varies by 
nation.162 Australian courts consider: (1) the express wishes of the child at
the beginning of the analysis; (2) medical opinions; (3) the child’s quality
of life; and (4) the impairments and benefits of treatment.163 British courts 
similarly examine medical evidence, the parents or guardians’ wishes, and 
the legal framework, which includes the human rights entrenched in British 
law.164 Australia does not have a set policy but instead decides cases on a
case-by-case basis.165 Like the UK, parents’ wishes in Australia are considered 
but are not decisive.166 
One critique of the best interest principle is that it lacks certainty. As 
shown by the analyses comparing the test application in the UK and in 
Australia, there is no international consensus as to the appropriate hierarchy 
of decisive values. Therefore, the question arises as to whether the courts
should be primarily concerned with the child’s happiness, spiritual and 
religious training, or future economic productivity.167 Determining what 
is best for a child seems to be the equivalent of essentially deciding the 
value of the child’s life. If so, this may be a more appropriate determination 
for the parent or guardian to make. Even where legislation provides guidance
regarding factors to consider in making a decision about a child’s best 
interest, that guidance seems to remain normative rather than objective. 
Alfie Evan’s case illustrates this point: While the court opined it was
saving Alfie in acting in his best interest, what it was saving Alfie from 
remains unclear, given that he did not appear to be in pain. Additionally, 
moving Alfie to an Italian hospital would have not deprived other young 
patients at Alder Hey from benefitting from the medical treatment Alfie 
161. See discussion, infra Section III.A. 
162. Marit Skivenes & Line M. Sorsdal, The Child’s Best Interest Principle across 
Child Protection Jurisdiction, HUM. RTS. IN CHILD. PROTECTION 59, 61, 71 (2018). 
163. Id. at 71–72, 75–76. 
164. Id.; see also generally Best Interests, WIKIPEDIA (Feb. 10, 2020), https://en. 
wikipedia.org/wiki/Best_interests [https://perma.cc/2BQ2-5V2Z].
165.  Skivenes & Sorsdal, supra note 162, at 72. 
166. Id. at 75–76. 
167. Id. at 64–65. 
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was receiving at the time.168 Both the court and the doctors felt that he 
could never recover or live without the constant aid of medical assistance, 
and therefore death was in his best interest: this seemed to be the sole 
reason for refusing his moving to Italy.
Charlie Gard’s and Alfie Evans’s cases show the horrifying reality of a 
state applying the best interest test to unilaterally decide a sick child’s 
future, including whether that sick child should die, even though she is not in
pain and her parents have made arrangements for her to be cared for in 
another country at no expense to the state. 
Unlike the UK and Australia, neither the United States nor Israel absolutely 
abide by the best interest standard.169 Israeli law balances patient’s autonomy
and sanctity of life but does not prioritize the best interest of the child.170 
In the United States, there is no single standard of treatment; ultimately,
although parents may sometimes override medical judgment to pursue 
experimental treatment, parental wishes and the child’s best interest are
not always the guiding principles.171 
II. AUTONOMY 
The second major prong in determining how to proceed with treatment
for a critically ill child is the notion of patient autonomy.172 Patient autonomy 
is the right of patients to make decision about their treatment without medical
providers trying to influence their decision.173 Patient autonomy is vital
because it does not allow for physicians or medical staff to make any decision 
for the patient174 and instead leaves the decision to the patient and their 
families or guardians. This is important, namely because it allows the patient 
168. John O’Sullivan, The State-Ordered Killing of Young Alfie Evans, NAT. REV. 
(Apr. 23, 2018),  https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/the-state-ordered-killing-of-young-
alfie-evans/ [https://perma.cc/Y6FW-2459].
169. See generally Yehiel S. Kaplan, The Right of a Minor in Israel to Participate
in the Decision-Making Process Concerning His or Her Medical Treatment, 25 FORDHAM 
INT’L L. J. 1085 (2001). 
170. Id. 
171. See End-of-Life Decision Making for Unborn and Newborn Infants, CARLTON 
FIELDS (Sept. 1, 2014), https://www.carltonfields.com/insights/publications/2014/end-of-
life-decision-making-for-unborn-and-newborn [https://perma.cc/74TV-B3BC].
172. Nancy Lau, PhD & Randall Curtis, MD, Identifying the Best Approach to 
Patient-Centered Decisions About Serious Illness Care, JAMA NETWORK (Jan. 25, 2019), 
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2722569 [https://perma.cc/
85K8-966B].
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and their families and guardians to proceed with a treatment that best aligns
with their values and circumstances. 
For purposes of this Comment, patient autonomy in the context of 
guardians making decisions for their minor children is referred to as 
“guardian autonomy.” That is because patient autonomy in the context of 
a minor patient, specifically a patient under the age of two years, is 
virtually nonexistent. Because a child that age has not developed enough
to make coherent decisions regarding his or her medical care, it is impossible 
to know what the child wants. Therefore, the autonomy of the guardian is 
the only relevant concern, which is problematic as the best interest of the 
child may differ from the best interests of the parents. Because it is
impossible to assume that the interests of the child and the parent are
aligned, the objection to treatment may still exist and thus relying on autonomy 
alone cannot provide a satisfactory resolution. 
A. Israel 
Israel is a country that places high value on patient autonomy.175 Israel 
historically focused on sanctity of life as the guiding principle for 
decisions relating to end-of-life care,176 which could be attributed to the 
influence of Jewish tradition on legislature. As a result, physicians seemingly 
had the authority to disregard the wishes of patients and guardians in favor 
of preserving life, even when there was evidence that the patient was
suffering and without hope for a cure.177 The case of Yael Schefer is one 
such case where the physician continued to provide treatment even when
the guardian wished to stop treatment.178 
1. Yael Shefer 
Yael Shefer was born with Tay Sachs disease179 in Israel in 1986. 
Physicians told her mother that Yael’s condition would inevitably worsen, 
and so when Yael was two years old, her mother applied to the District 
175. See PATIENT’S BILL OF RIGHTS, MINISTRY OF HEALTH (ISR.), https://www.health.
gov.il/English/Topics/RightsInsured/Pages/patient_rights.aspx [https://perma.cc/manage/
create?folder=24392-63677-78948]. 
176. Carmel Shalev, End-of-Life Care in Israel—The Dying Patient Law, 2005, 42 
ISR. L. REV. 279, 279 (2009). 
177. Id. at 287. 
178.  CA 506/88 Yael Shefer v. State of Israel 48(1) PD 78 (1993) (Isr.). 
179. Id. 
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Court for a declaratory judgment asking that Yael not be forced to accept
further treatment, as her mother believed it would be futile.180 The District 
Court denied the application, and in 1988, the Supreme Court affirmed
the denial.181 The Court ruled that the supreme principle of sanctity of life 
adopted by Israel as a Jewish and democratic state did not permit intervention 
in Yael’s treatment.182 The Court explained that there was no evidence
that Yael was suffering as a result of her illness; thus, withdrawing treatment 
was not a legally permissible option.183 
Yael’s case is an example of how religious culture and tradition, specifically 
Judaism, influences Israeli legislature. For instance, Judaism does not
distinguish between religious and secular existence, and thus Halacha,184 the 
collective body of Jewish law, guides not only religious practice but most 
aspects of its followers’ lives.185 Jewish teachings instruct that the value
and sanctity of human life is immeasurable, and thus any act that hastens 
death, including the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, is akin to 
murder.186 Therefore, as a general rule, omitting life-sustaining treatment
(considered passive euthanasia) is permitted while terminating life-
sustaining treatment (considered active euthanasia) is prohibited.187188 This 
was the case for Yael, where the Court refused to issue a judgment that
would allow Yael’s mother to terminate her treatment.  
The decision in Yael’s case seemingly contradicted a previously offered
viewpoint by an Israeli Supreme Court Justice, Menachem Elon.189 Prior 
to the decision in Yael’s case, Justice Elon authored an instructive treatise 
where he compared the law in common law jurisdictions with Jewish
Halakhic sources.190 He concluded that there was a distinction between 
active and passive euthanasia but did not clarify which category the




 183. Id. 
184. Halacha includes Tanach (biblical law), Talmudic, and rabbinic law, and customs.
Charles L. Sprung, The Israeli Terminally Ill Law, DEP’T OF ANESTHESIOLOGY AND 




 187. Terminating treatment is to cease ongoing interventions. Omitting treatment is 
to decline to intervene in the first place.
188. Id. 
189. Justice Elon has since passed away, but during his tenure as Justice, he was a 
prolific writer and he was at one point a presidential candidate.
190. MENACHEM ELON, PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAW (1975). 
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into.191 Yael’s case did little to clarify this distinction, and it also failed to 
address the legal effect of advance directives.192 
In the aftermath of cases like Yael’s, patients and guardians began to 
voice concern over their lack of independence in formulating their own
treatment plans and the passage of new legislature, beginning with the 
Patient Right Act and culminating with the Dying Patient Law, struck 
a balance between the more traditional principle of sanctity of life and the 
individual desire for patient autonomy. 
a. Patient Rights Law 
The Patient’s Rights Law (PRL) was enacted in 1996, primarily to remedy 
what was perceived as an imbalance of authority between physicians and
patients.193 Prior to the passage of the PRL, citizens voiced their desire for 
more patient autonomy,194 in particular for the recognition of patient
independence in making medical decisions, specifically regarding end-of-
life treatment. The PRL gave patients more rights, framed as protection 
against potential abuse of power by medical professionals.195 
As a result of the PRL’s enactment, medical professionals generally
took a cautious approach to treatment in favor of prolonging life, which
led to a number of patients petitioning the courts for declaratory relief to
manage their own treatment plans.196 The courts explored the extent of the
autonomy rights and the distinction between the rights to withhold and to 
withdraw treatment, whether by express wish or advance directive.197 In 
contrast to the traditional Jewish distinction,198 the courts largely held there 
was no legal difference between the rights of withholding and withdrawing 
treatment.199 Accordingly, based on the principle of patient autonomy, 
191. CA 506/88 Yael Shefer (a minor) by her mother and natural guardian Talila Shefer
v. State of Israel OM 779/88 (1993) (Isr.). 
192. Id.; see also Section III.C. (discussing advance directives). 
193. Shalev, supra note 176. 
194. Id. 
195. Id.
 196. Id. at 283. 
197. Id. at 283–84. 
198. See Sprung, supra note 184. 
199. Shalev, supra note 176, at 283. 
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treatment could be discontinued lawfully, 200 resulting in a stark divergence 
from Jewish tradition.201 
However, in two cases heard by the Supreme Court, both of which 
involved young children suffering from severe congenital disorders, the 
Court dismissed the petitions of the parents requesting the withholding of 
treatment.202 In 1999, the Israeli Supreme Court issued two rulings in the
case of a young child suffering from cerebral palsy and an acute kidney 
condition.203 First, the Court held that the patient’s quality of life is not a
legitimate consideration in judicial rulings,204 and second, that individuals 
should err in favor of preserving life when doubt exists as to whether the 
patient should be treated.205 The Supreme Court ruled that the parents did 
not have the right to refuse treatment on behalf of the child, who was 
subsequently subjected to fourteen surgical interventions before he passed
away two years later.206 
b. Dying Patient Law 
The period following the passage of the PRL brought years of political
impasse on legislature involving end-of-life treatment.207 However, in 
2005, following calls to address issues of legal standing for family of
patients and a lack of sufficient guidelines for physicians,208 Israel enacted 
the Dying Patient Law (DPL),209 the first law globally to regulate end-of-
life treatment.210 The DPL was presented as a balance between patient 
autonomy and sanctity of life,211 paralleling the balance between Israeli 
culture and Jewish tradition.212 
Although Israeli courts had increasingly developed the concept of 
patient autonomy as early as the 1960s, the DPL represented the most 
legislative deference given to patients in choosing their treatment to date.
Israeli courts previously understood patient autonomy to stem from the 
200. Id. 
201. Id.
 202. Id. at 284. The two cases were: CA 506/88 Yael Shefer v. State of Israel 48(1) 
PD 78 (1993) (Isr.); LCA 5587/97 Attorney-General v. Ben-Ikar 51(4) PD 830 (1997) (Isr.). 




 207. Id. at 279, 283. 
208. Sprung, supra note 184. 
209.  Dying Patient Law, 5765-2005, SH No. 330 (Isr.). 
210. Y. Michael Barilan, The New Israeli Law on the Care of the Terminally Ill, 50 
PERSPECTIVES IN BIOLOGY AND MED. 557 (2007); Sprung, supra note 184. 
211. Shalev, supra note 176. 
212. For example, it lays down a duty on physicians to make proactive efforts to 
inquire into the desired course of treatment of their patients. Id. 
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fundamental Israeli constitutional rights to dignity, liberty, and privacy213 
and to signify the “positive concept of liberty.”214 The Israeli Supreme
Court held that patient autonomy is violated when medical treatment is
administered without a patient’s consent and therefore is a violation of
human dignity,215 which is consistent with the Jewish principle that omission
of treatment is permissible. The DPL took into consideration this construal 
and those of the past, which focused on sanctity of life,216 and ultimately
reflected orthodox interpretations of Halakha on public values and bioethics.
The DPL addressed patient autonomy concerns by recognizing the legal
effect of advance directives and the appointment of proxy decision makers.217 
When disagreements relating to treatment arise between physicians and
the patient or family, the parties are instructed to resolve it through a local
and national ethics committee instead of going before a court.218 The DPL 
addressed communication concerns between physicians and patients’ and 
sought to provide effective mechanisms to resolve disputes, including when 
the patient did not desire treatment.219 
B. Autonomy Discussion 
Guardian autonomy commands a high level of respect because of the
unique and close relationship between a parent or guardian and a child. 
The guardian’s position to better understand the needs of the child should 
lead to deference toward the guardian’s decisions regarding treatment.
This autonomy matters because the guardian is respected regardless of
whether the public opines that the guardian is wrong. This deference raises 
important points. First, the guardian is empirically more likely to be right 
because of the epistemic privilege inherent in guardianship. The insight 
and understanding into the child’s life and the values and experiences the 
guardian wants the child to have lends to a fundamental parental advantage 
in deciding the course of medical treatment for the child. Second, there is 
213. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, THE KNESSET, https://www.knesset.
gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2019). 
214. Isaiah Berlin termed the “positive concept of liberty,” which derives from the
wish of the individual to be his own master. ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 125 
(Oxford U. Press 1969).
215.  CA 2781/193 Ali Da’aka v. Carmel Hospital 53(4) PD 526 (1999) (Isr.). 
216. Shalev, supra note 176. 
217.  Dying Patient Law, 5765-2005, SH No. 330. (Isr.). 
218. Id.
 219. Id. 
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the question of whether this life or death situation is the same or different 
in the context of parental decisions. One argument is that this is an extension 
of the decisions that society defers to guardians and is no different than
whether the child learns religion or is homeschooled. The counterargument 
is that this decision is different because of the life and death implications, 
the potential for extreme suffering, and the possible cost to the public 
system.
The notion of guardian autonomy in the context of treatment decisions 
raises several other issues including the government’s role and the amount 
of intervention it should be allowed; financial implications and who pays 
for the treatment; and religious values, which are unique and innate to the 
individual holding them. 
1. Government Intervention 
The interplay between guardian autonomy and state action in making
end-of-life treatment decisions differs by nation.220 As the cases of Charlie 
and Alfie demonstrate, if a public body in the UK decides that a parent’s
choices risk harming a child, it can challenge the parent in court; doctors
and social workers can request a judicial order to override the legal state
of parental responsibility.221 These cases show a shift in British caselaw 
to allowing states to supersede the autonomy of the child’s guardian. As 
recently as 2005, a judge characterized an application that would give
doctors the “last word” on her treatment as “wholly novel,”222 but just over
ten years later, this application has become ostensibly routine. It appears
that over the past decade, the notion that doctors have the final judgment in
end-of-life cases for minors has become increasingly and unquestioningly
conventional.223 Cases like Alfie and Charlie seem to confirm the policy, 
at least in the UK, that children belong to the state.224 
220. ANDREW WEBB ET AL., OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF CRITICAL CARE 1856 (Andrew Webb 
et al. eds., 2d ed. 2016). 
221. Holly Christodoulou, RIGHT TO DECIDE: What are Charlie’s Law and Alfie’s 
Law, what rights would they give parents over their children’s care and who has backed 
them?, THE SUN (Sept. 3, 2018), https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/6156576/alfies-law-
charlies-law-rights-parents-care-alfie-evans-charlie-gard/ [https://perma.cc/2YU5-2DMY].
222. Wyatt v. Portsmouth NHS Trust and Another [2005] EWHC 693 (Fam) (Eng.). 
223. See Susan Scutti, Could Charlie Gard’s Case Happen in the United States?, 
CNN (July 6, 2017),  https://www.cnn.com/2017/07/06/health/charlie-gard-us-laws/index.
html [https://perma.cc/FTF2-BJY8].
224. However, recent legislation in the UK calls for Members of Parliament to legislate
to give parents more rights over their child’s hospital treatment. The campaign recognizes 
the dedication of medical professionals treating sick children, but also that parents have
“moral rights.” Christodoulou, supra note 221. 
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Similarly, on a continental level, the European court has assumed a 
paternalistic role by upholding the UK court’s overriding the guardians’ 
wishes in the cases discussed.225 As a result of these European legal and 
political systems that are based on the primacy of the state’s authority,
disputes over a child’s medical care inevitably result in a limitation of 
parental authority.226 
This European approach can be contrasted to that in the United States,
where the U.S. Constitution provides for privacy rights.227 American case 
law makes clear that the basis for parental decision-making is the constitutional
right to privacy.228  This includes decisions relating to a child’s medical 
treatment. Both state and the federal constitutions protect parents’ rights
to make important decisions for and on behalf of their minor children.229 
The constitutionally protected privacy interest in making important decisions 
on behalf of their children includes the right to assert their child’s right to 
life.230 
2. Financial Implications 
Patient and guardian autonomy are seemingly dependent on who bears 
the cost of continuing treatment. In the UK, the National Health Service 
(NHS) offers health care funded by general taxation,231 which allows the 
state to assert moral leadership over every aspect of its citizens’ lives,
including what treatment is administered to hospitalized children.232 Because 
the NHS assumes the cost of treatment, the decisions lies with the state. 
225. Broad, supra note 27. 
226. See id. 
227. Compare Emeline L.K. Diener, Feature: Who’s Your Daddy?, 40 PA. LAWYER 
38, 43 (2018) with Broad, supra note 27. 
228. Diener, supra note 227. 
229. In Rideout v. Hershey Medical Center, 30 Pa. D. & C. 4th 57 (1995), a physician
unilaterally turned off the respirator of a young girl with a malignant brain tumor, in spite 
of her parents’ protests. After the child’s death, her parents brought suit claiming the hospital
had deprived them of parental rights and free exercise of religion. The hospital demurred 
to these claims, and the court held that while the parents had a constitutionally protected 
privacy interest in making decisions on behalf of their child, they had no right of action 
under federal law. 
230. See Diener, supra note 227, at 44. 
231. O’Grady, supra note 141. 
232. Ted Bromund, Britain’s National Health Service Isn’t A World Beater, FORBES 
(Oct. 30, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tedbromund/2016/10/30/britains-national-
health-service-isnt-a-world-beater/#1f0c925a45f9 [https://perma.cc/XGV6-W8M9]. 
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The inexorable issue that arises in a system such as the NHS is sustainability. 
Because the public is unwilling to pay higher taxes, the UK spends less 
on health services than other nations with similar systems. As a result, the 
NHS is required to ration the treatment it provides.233 This has led to 
record numbers of patients traveling abroad to receive medical treatment
as the NHS struggles to cope with demand,234 which contrasts with the 
court’s explicit refusal to allow terminally ill minors to leave hospitals to
seek treatment. The lack of funds and unavailability of medical care seems 
inextricably intertwined with treatment decisions and therefore presents a
fundamental conflict. Minimizing the state’s involvement in treatment 
decisions is a possible solution.
The case of Alfie Evans raises the counterargument that because the
family did not ask the British government to pay for the expensive treatment,
cost was clearly not a factor in the court’s decision.235 However, it is possible,
and likely, that the court was still concerned with equitable administration
of treatment. If the court allowed Alfie to be treated without the financial aid 
of the NHS, the backlash of disallowing a different child to be treated
because of the guardian’s inability to pay without assistance from the NHS 
would be severe. 
Issues of cost also arise in Israel, as providing intensive care for children
on life support can cost thousands of dollars a day. Some health professionals 
argue that such care, while seeming compassionate, can jeopardize the 
health of other critically ill children who could benefit from those resources.236 
One possible negative effect of the Israeli law is the large number of patients
spending years on life support, often unconscious, because of laws against
removing artificial ventilation.237 
The role of government in healthcare in Australia is similar to that of 
the UK and Europe generally, in that it usurps the function of patient and 
233. Id. 
234. The timing of the number of patients leaving Britain for overseas treatment was
contemporaneous with a suppression on “health tourism” within the UK. Under EU reciprocal 
arrangements, British citizens are entitled to receive treatment elsewhere in Europe, with 
costs covered by the health service, provided it is treatment the NHS typically funds. Laura 
Donnelly & Katie Morley, Soaring numbers flying abroad for medical care as NHS lists 
lengthen, THE TELEGRAPH (Oct. 22, 2017), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/10/22/ 
soaring-numbers-flying-abroad-medical-care-nhs-lists-lengthen/ [https://perma.cc/UY5J-
7XKW].
235. Supra Section I.A.2. 
236. See generally, supra Section II.A.1. (providing an example of a terminal patient 
who was nonetheless forced to receive medical treatment when medical resources could 
have been spent on a patient who could have recovered to live a full life).
237. Sprung, supra note 184. 
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guardian autonomy.238 Australia justifies government involvement by
theorizing that private markets alone provide too little of the public goods 
crucial for health, and government action may be needed to compensate 
for problems generated by uncertainty and insurance market failure.239 
These justifications can be countered by comparing the Australian system 
to the NHS. Not only does the NHS experience a shortage of public goods 
relating to healthcare, but the problems stemming from the NHS have
palpably caused patients to go abroad for treatment. In contrast, the United 
States has thus far avoided moving to a nationalized healthcare system. 
3. Religious Implications 
One similarity between the legislative motivations of Israel and the United 
States is the fundamental religious influence, which lends to patient and
guardian autonomy. One of the central elements to the founding of the 
United States was a desire for religious freedom and limited governmental 
intervention in all aspects of life, including medical treatment.240 Under 
the Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution,241 parents have
the right to freely exercise their religion on behalf of their children.242 
Because of the way the United States Supreme Court has interpreted, or 
rather refused to interpret, “religion,” any sincere and meaningful belief, 
even if not logical or comprehensible to others, and even if the individual 
cannot articulate it, is protected under the First Amendment.243 This protection
extends to medical treatment decisions made on the basis of religious 
238. Rebecca Bailey-Harris, The Family Law Reform Act 1995 (CTH): A New Approach 
to the Parent/Child Relationship, 8 ADEL. L. REV. 83, 86 (1996). 
239. Philip Hagan & Andrew Podger, Reforming the Australian Health Care System: 
The Role of Government, 2-3 Commonwealth Dep’t of Health and Aged Care (Mar. 1999), 
http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/4FC61B6C2C9937CDC
A257BF0001D3BA7/$File/ocpanew1.pdf [https://perma.cc/AT97-GBPD].
240. Founders’ Quotes on Founding Principles, BILL OF RIGHTS INST., https://billofrights
institute.org/founding-documents/founders-quotes/ [https://perma.cc/V66M-D5CQ] (last
visited Mar. 14, 2020). 
241. U.S. CONST. Amend. I. 
242. States also provide additional protection for free exercise of religion. In Rideout, the 
court quoted the Pennsylvania Constitution, Art. I, sec. 3, which states that “no human 
authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience.” The 
hospital demurred on the grounds that a belief that a life is sacred, standing alone, is not a 
“religious belief.” The court also refused to dismiss that claim. Rideout v. Hershey Medical 
Center, 30 Pa. D. & C. 4th 57, 84–84 (1995). 
243. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234–35 (1972) (holding a law mandating school 
attendance unduly burdened the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution). 
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beliefs.244  However, some cases245 indicate a slow but steady trend in
American medicine, mirroring that of Europe’s, in allowing doctors to
overrule or even ignore parental decision-making with judicial approval.246 
Comparably, Israel implemented Jewish principles relating to autonomy
and sanctity into legislature: a patient is entitled to formulate his or her
own treatment plan.247 Sanctity of life overrules autonomy by prohibiting 
any action that intentionally and actively shortens life; autonomy overrules 
the sanctity of life by permitting the withholding of treatments directly
related to the dying process in accordance with the patient’s wishes.248 
244. See Diener, supra note 227, at 44. 
245. In 2016, two-year-old Israel Stinson was declared brain-dead after a severe 
asthma attack led to cardiac arrest and limited oxygen flow to his brain. Doctors advised 
that he be removed from life support, but Israel’s parents fought in court to keep him on 
life support, hoping to eventually care for him at home. Before they could take him from 
the medical center, Israel required operations to insert feeding and breathing tubes, which
the medical center refused to perform. After a federal judge rejected the family’s lawsuit 
in May of 2016, Israel’s parents flew him to a private hospital in Guatemala, where doctors 
were willing to give him a feeding and breathing tubes. Until that point, Israel had been 
surviving on a diet of dextrose. In Guatemala, doctors reported that Israel’s condition was 
improving, and tests showed Israel had brain activity. Doctors performed electroencephalogram
(EEG) tests and detected slight electrical activity in Israel’s brain, and movement in his 
pupils. After about three months, Israel was accepted as a patient at Children’s Hospital in 
Los Angeles. The family returned to the United States, but shortly thereafter, the hospital 
determined that Israel should be removed from life support. This was shocking because 
just a week prior, the court issued a temporary order to stop the hospital from removing 
the ventilator until they could get an opinion from another neurologist. Israel’s parents 
sought an injunction to prevent Children’s Hospital from taking action while they arranged 
to put him in home care. On Tuesday, August 23, the hospital informed Israel’s mother 
that it would file a motion to oppose the injunction, which was filed on the following 
Thursday. The struggle to save Israel ended when a Los Angeles Superior Judge ruled in 
favor of the hospital’s decision. Immediately following the ruling, Israel’s ventilator was 
removed, and he passed away. CBS LOS ANGELES, Family Shocked After Brain-Dead Boy 
Removed From Life Support (Aug. 25, 2016), https://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2016/08/25/ 
family-shocked-after-brain-dead-boy-removed-from-life-support/ [https://perma.cc/HP27-
5Y58] [hereinafter Family Shocked]; Erica Evans, After court rules against parents, toddler is 
taken off life support, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/
la-me-ln-toddler-life-support-20160826-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/46RW-HSCH];
Claudia Buck, Court documents reveal final details behind brain-dead toddler case, THE 
SACRAMENTO BEE (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.sacbee.com/news/local/health-and- 
medicine/article100885077.html [https://perma.cc/T8RN-BQ7J]; Fonseca v. Kaiser Permanente 
Med. Ctr. Roseville, 222 F. Supp. 3d 850 (E.D. Cal. May, 13 2016). Compare with Israel’s 
policy in Sprung, supra note 184 (describing that it is unlawful to end treatment, regardless 
of parents’ decisions). 
246. Bovard, supra note 2. 
247. Sprung, supra note 184. 
248. Id. 
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III. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
While best interest and autonomy are the two pivotal considerations in
resolving disputes over a child’s end-of-life treatment, there are other possible
means and guidelines to resolve disputes. Mediation is one way to prevent 
litigation over disputes, and legislative measures on experimental treatment, 
“Do Not Resuscitate” orders, and advance directives may provide further 
guidance in resolving disputes over treatment. 
A. Mediation 
Another consideration in the medical decision-making process is the
role of mediation: in the context of treatment decisions, mediation is a 
private process where a neutral third person (the mediator) aids the parties,
usually the guardians of the child and the medical staff, in discussing and 
resolving the dispute.249 During mediation, the parties have the opportunity 
to discuss the issues, explain their interests and feelings, provide each 
other with information, and explore possible resolutions to the dispute.250 
This often leads to a more favorable alternative than a court order, although
clearly mediation does not resolve all disputes. 
Current legislature is proposed in the UK to require the involvement of 
independent medical mediators as early as possible251 in the process so 
that physicians and the patient’s family can come to an agreed-upon course 
of action.252 Similarly, Israel’s DPL requirement that parties in conflict 
should resolve their issues through a local and national ethics committee 
keeps them from resorting to the courts. However, although mediation is 
widely viewed as an initial method of dispute resolution, there seems to
be questions about its actual effectiveness given what is at stake. 
249. See Mediation, Dispute Resolution Process, ABA [https://perma.cc/9H2W-L3G6]. 
250. Id. 
251. Great Ormond Street Hospital has previously stated that “mediation is one of 
the important ways in which we work with families to reach agreements, in the best interests of
the child.” Catherine Burns, Charlie Gard’s parents want ‘Charlie’s Law’, BBC News, 
(June 20, 2018) [https://perma.cc/4WJU-MYTW]. 
252. Charlie’s parents claimed they asked for mediation months prior to his death, 
but the hospital refused to facilitate it until the final few days of his life. Charlie’s father 
noted that “[i]f mediation had taken place with an independent mediator, we would have
felt our voices were being listened to.” Instead, Charlie’s parents were forced to engage in
a long legal battle. Id. 
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1. Australia 
In recent years, Australia has legislated to increase the focus on mediation 
and primary dispute resolution.253 In 1990, Australia became a signatory
state to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, and as 
a result adopted the Australia’s Family Law Reform Act (FLRA) of 1995.254 
The FLRA represented a shift away from lengthy and expensive litigation 
and enabled parties to reach optimal resolutions while minimizing the
psychological and emotional impact.255 
B. Experimental Treatment 
Another consideration in end-of-life care is the availability of experimental
treatment. “Right to Try” laws allow patients with life-threatening conditions256 
to bypass drug regulations to gain access to experimental treatment.257 
These laws provide one way for patients to get non-traditional treatment. 
1. United States 
In 2018, President Donald Trump signed Bill S.204,258 which created a 
uniform system for terminal patients seeking access to investigational 
treatments in states that did not have a Right to Try law.259 The legislation
allows gravely ill patients to request medicines that have cleared initial 
phases of testing, but that have not yet been approved by the Food and 
Drug Administration (“FDA”).260 This bill provides a new pathway for
terminally ill patients who have exhausted government-approved options 
and cannot get into a clinical trial to access treatments261 and allows patients 
253. Bailey-Harris, supra note 238, at 84. 
254. Id.
 255. Clare Decena, The History of the Family Law Act & its Amendments, Family Law 
Express (May 16, 2014), [https://perma.cc/G6NX-V38F].
256. Federal law defines a life-threatening disease or condition as: “Diseases or 
conditions where the likelihood of death is high unless the course of the disease is 
interrupted.” 21 CFR 312.81(a)(1). 
257.  Angelica LaVito, Trump signs ‘right-to-try’ allowing gravely ill patients to bypass
FDA for experimental treatments, CNBC (May 30, 2018) [https://perma.cc/KCU2-8NN7]. 
258. Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bellina, 
Right to Try Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-176, § 2. Donald Trump signed this bill into
law on May 30, 2018; see also Federal Right To Try: Questions and Answers, RIGHTTOTRY, 
http://righttotry.org/rtt-faq/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2019). 
259. Forty states previously had versions of right to try legislation. Right to Try, supra
note 258. 
260. LaVito, supra note 257. 
261.  Right to Try Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-176, § 2. 
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to circumvent a system where testing and approval by the FDA may take 
several years.262 
To be eligible for Right to Try in the United States, an individual must: 
(1) be diagnosed with a life-threatening disease or condition;263 (2) have
exhausted approved treatment options, including participation in a clinical 
trial; and (3) provide written consent regarding the risks associated with 
taking the investigational treatment.264 
However, under Right to Try laws, doctors are not obligated to request 
treatment if they do not professionally opine that such treatment could 
help the patient.265 Similarly, drug companies are not required to provide 
treatment266 and are permitted to develop their own policy and procedures
for approving Right to Try requests.267 Federal laws allow the company to
recover costs directly related to providing an individual treatment, but prohibits 
making a profit on any drug or treatment not approved by the FDA.268 
Right to Try legislation allows guardians to elect a course of experimental 
treatment that has not yet met national standards. In the United States, 
courts give weight to medical opinions but provide guardians with wide 
latitude regarding experimental treatment.269 In contrast, the ECtHR has 
held that Article 2 of the ECHR cannot be interpreted to require access to
experimental treatment, or to require the adoption of particular regulation 
for experimental treatment, meaning patients do not have access to non-
government approved treatment.270 
262. LaVito, supra note 257. 
263. American federal law defines a life-threatening disease or condition as: “Diseases 
or conditions where the likelihood of death is high unless the course of the disease is
interrupted.”
264.  Right to Try Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-176, § 2. 
265. Id. 
266. Right to Try Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-176, § 2; Right to Try, supra note 
258; Thaddeus Mason Pope, Why Oncologists Should Decline to Participate in the Right 
to Try Act, THE ASCO POST (Aug. 10, 2018), http://www.ascopost.com/issues/august-10-
2018/ declining-to-participate-in-the-right-to-try-act/. 
267. Right to Try Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-176, § 2; Right to Try, supra note 258.
 268. Id.
 269. See McMath v. State of Cal., No. 15-CV-06042-HSG, 2016 WL 7188019, 7 
(N.D.C.A. Dec. 12, 2016). 
270. See supra Section I.A. 
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C. Advance Directives 
Patients may also consider the use of advance directives in determining 
end-of-life treatment. An advance directive is a legal document that tells 
the patient’s physician and family what type of medical care the patient 
desires for when the patient will be incapable of doing so.271 Texas is one 
of several U.S. states with an advance directives law. Section 166.046 of 
the Texas Advance Directives Act (TADA) gives physicians and hospitals 
the ability to discontinue life-sustaining care even when a patient’s 
guardian desires to continue treatment.272 Section 166.046 of TADA 
mandates what happens when a patient’s physician does not want to abide 
by a patient’s advance directive or by the direct wishes of the patient’s 
family.273 This typically occurs when the physician wants to deny a request 
for life-sustaining treatment and means that, under the TADA, medical 
workers are allowed to withdraw life-sustaining treatment. 
The TADA has been in U.S. news recently because of its effect on the
case of baby Tinslee Lewis.274 Tinslee is currently at the Cook Children’s
Medical Center in Fort Worth, Texas.275 She has been hospitalized with 
lung and heart problems since her birth.276 Tinslee’s mother has said that 
she wants to be the person who makes the decision for her child. Her 
physicians counter that their care is causing Tinslee pain without hope for 
a cure, and thus the care should be halted.277 A trial court ruled that her 
271. Advance Directives and Do Not Resuscitate Orders, FAMILYDOCTOR.ORG, 
https://familydoctor.org/advance-directives-and-do-not-resuscitate-orders/ [https://perma.cc/ 
K4EZ-LUF2] (last visited Apr. 6, 2020). 
272. Advance Directives Act, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY § 166.046 (1999); Rachael 
Thompson, Comment, Searching for Fairness: Examining the Texas Advance Directives 
Act in Light of the Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard, 56 HOUS. L. REV. (2019). 
273. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY § 166.046 (1999). 
274. See generally Raga Justin, Texas anti-abortion activists take on baby Tinslee’s 
life support case, attempting to strike down a law that protects doctors, TEXAS TRIB.  (Feb.
20, 2020), https://www.texastribune.org/2020/02/20/baby-tinslee-lewis-case-attracts-attention-
anti-abortion-groups/ [https://perma.cc/Q9KE-4KMJ]; Wade Goodwyn, Legal Battle Over 
Terminally Ill Child Raises Sanctity of Life Questions, NPR (Jan. 17, 2020), https://
www.npr.org/2020/01/17/797220652/legal-battle-over-terminally-ill-child-raises-sanctity-
of-life-questions [https://perma.cc/2LD9-QGCG]. 
275. Rebecca Flores, Gov. Abbott backing Fort Worth baby Tinslee Lewis as doctors 
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doctors could terminate treatment, but the court of appeals stayed that
ruling pending appeal.278 279 As of this writing, the case is still under appeal. 
D. Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders 
Do-not-resuscitate (DNR) orders may be part of an advance directive. 
A DNR is a request not to have cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) should
the patient’s heart stop or should the patient stop breathing.280 
The primary issue regarding DNR orders arises when there is a unilateral 
entry of the DNR in the patient’s medical file, which is becoming increasingly 
frequent, as demonstrated in the United States, where approximately half 
of the responding physicians revealed in a survey that they endorsed
unilateral DNR orders as “appropriate.”281 In the same survey, twenty percent 
of responding pulmonary critical-care physicians reported they implemented 
unilateral DNR orders in the previous year.282 
In response to this uptick in unilateral DNR entry, several U.S. states
have legislated to provide guardians with additional safeguards in making 
treatment decisions for their children.283 Simon’s Law,284 a state law passed 
in Kansas in 2017, ends the practice of physicians placing DNR orders on 
278. Alexandria Hein, Texas judge rules hospital can remove baby Tinslee Lewis 
from life support, family has week to appeal, FOXNEWS (Jan. 2, 2020), https://www.foxnews.com/
health/texas-judge-rules-hospital-can-remove-tinslee-lewis-life-support-family-week-to-
appeal [https://perma.cc/6E89-FGEM]. 
279. Texas Governor Greg Abbott and Attorney General Ken Paxton filed a “friend 
of the court brief” in support of Tinslee and her family requesting reversal of the recent
trial court ruling that physicians can remove baby Tinslee from life support if they
get approval from the hospital’s board. See Flores, supra note 275. 
280. FAMILYDOCTOR.ORG, supra note 271. 
281. Michael S. Putman, Unilateral Do Not Resuscitate Orders, 152 CHEST J. 224– 
25 (2017).
282. Id.
 283. See Bovard, supra note 2. 
284. Simon Crosier was born with a condition called Trisomy 18, a serious congenital 
illness which requires life-sustaining medical treatment but is not necessarily fatal. 
Unbeknownst to Simon’s parents, the doctors had placed a “Do Not Resuscitate” (DNR)
order on Simon’s medical chart, which directly conflicted with his parents’ hopes that he
would grow strong for corrective heart surgery. Simon’s parents watched doctors stand by
as their three-month old baby struggled to breathe and eventually pass away, just three
days before his scheduled surgical consultation. Following Simon’s death, his parents
uncovered not only the non-authorized, clandestine DNR, but also that Simon’s medical 
providers had only authorized “comfort feeds”—drops of sugar water designed to starve a 
patient to death—despite Simon’s mother’s pleas to feed him breastmilk. Simon’s case 
compelled states to act to protect parental decision-making. Bovard, supra note 2. 
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a minor patient’s chart without the informed consent of the child’s guardians285 
and requires written parental consent for a minor to receive the order.286 
Under Simon’s Law, parents are given the security to make medical
decisions for their child that parallel the advice of their doctors, their values, 
and their faith.287 Other U.S. states such as Missouri and Texas have followed 
Kansas by introducing their own versions of Simon’s Law.288 
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
A standard that better takes into account both the best interest and the 
autonomy of the patient is clearly needed. This section will discuss the 
objectives of a new code and the previously proposed UK legislation, and 
it will conclude with the formulation of a novel comprehensive model solution.
The solution will focus on an “extreme suffering” test that encompasses the
consideration of patient and guardian autonomy, the potential significant 
harm to the child, mediation, and implementation of the right to try legislation. 
One of the primary objectives of this proposed solution is to reduce the
time spent on litigation. In the cases discussed above, the parents of the
children spent an exorbitant amount of time and resources to navigate the 
judicial system and were deprived of precious time with their children. As 
a general policy goal, parents of dying children should not be placed in
the position where their only option is litigation. While deference to the
state may be appropriate in some instances, government intervention leads 
to potential overreach and severe infringement on guardian autonomy in
other cases; therefore, parental protections should be established. The final 
and ultimate aim is to consider alternatives to the best interest standard, 
which has been proven time and again to be a flawed standard. 
Under new proposed UK laws, parents or guardians—working with 
lawyers and medical experts—will be involved in formulating a treatment 
plan for their child.289 These laws are intended to address problems around
the best interest test used by courts and to increase transparency to resolve
cases before they reach the courts.290 A key part of the legislation would
be altering the way judges reach their decisions: the law proposes moving 
285. Id. 
286. According to the American College of Pediatricians, the doctor-patient relationship
should proceed with the physician offering medical facts coupled with hope, and if hope 
for survival becomes unwarranted, then physicians should discuss and reach understandings 
with the family regarding prognosis and interventions, which is what Simon’s Law codifies. 
Simon’s Law, AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PEDIATRICIANS, https://www.acpeds.org/the-college-
speaks/for-policy-makers/sanctity-of-life/simons-law (last visited Mar. 19, 2019). 
287. Id.
 288. Bovard, supra note 2. 
289. Christodoulou, supra note 221. 
290. Id. 
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from a framework where the judge must assess only what is in the best 
interest of the child to one where the judges asks if the parent’s choice of 
treatment would cause significant harm to the child.291 If the judge finds
that it would not, families will be permitted to try their proposed treatment.
The ECHR provides the requisite European law for a shift from the best 
interest standard to an “extreme suffering” test.292 Specifically, Article 8 
of the ECHR provides that individuals have the right to private and family
life and the right to be protected against interference by public authorities.293 
The right against government intervention as highlighted in Article 8 
offers the foundation for a transition from courts deciding what is in the 
child’s best interest to deciding whether the child is experiencing extreme
suffering. Thus, the burden of proof should be viewed through the lens of 
guardian autonomy. The proposed code should not focus on the best interest 
of the child, but rather on whether prolonged treatment would lead to
extreme suffering for the child. 
A. Disability Rights 
A new solution is important because the best interest test may unintentionally 
harm disability rights. The dispute regarding end-of-life decision-making 
prompts issues regarding the rights of those deemed physically incapacitated 
because it raises the question of what types of condition are considered 
unbearable in saving a life.
The decisions in the cases of Charlie Gard, Alfie Evans, and others reflect 
a profound and literally lethal intolerance of dependence and disability. In
each case, a hospital’s policy against children with seemingly permanent
disabilities ended with a totalitarian intervention by the state. Universally,
legislature should be revised to create a space for the profoundly disabled,
as well as the loved ones who wish to care for them, regardless of judgement
from those who deem an existence of radical dependence not worthy of 
life. 
Specifically, in Alfie Evans’s case, the court decided that Alfie’s life 
was no longer beneficial because he was too incapacitated to live a 
291. Id. 
292. See The ECHR, art. 8. 
293. Id. 
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traditionally desirable life.294 Even though there was no evidence that 
Alfie was suffering or in pain, and there was a medical consensus that “the 
high quality of care that Alfie [wa]s receiving at Alder Hey could ‘sustain
him for a long time,’”295 the court interpreted the 1989 Children Act to rule
that a life of permanent dependency and disability was not worth living.296 
In the end, the court sided with the physicians who contested that Alfie 
derived no benefit from efforts to keep him alive, even over the protests 
of his parents.297 
When such decisions become conventional, the family and guardians of 
the child are entirely shut out from the process. This is problematic because
different individuals have diverse value systems and place different levels
of worth on life with disabilities. Therefore, when courts do get involved, 
they should not rely on the detached opinions of physicians to place a value 
on the life of a disabled patient. 
Additionally, physicians could be wrong and so reliance on detached 
opinions could be flawed from the outset. For instance, in 2014, the parents
of a young child disagreed with the hospital and social workers over the 
best course of treatment for the child’s brain tumor.298 The family breached a
court order and fled with the child from the UK to France and Spain.299 
The child eventually received experimental treatment in the Czech Republic 
and is currently living cancer-free.300 Had the family adhered to the court
order issued relying upon the hospital’s expertise, the hospital would have 
withdrawn treatment and the child almost certainly would have perished. 
294. The state came to this conclusion via judicial proceedings that because Alfie’s 
disability was so severe as to “render his life so poor and bereft of meaningful benefits, it
[was] in his best interests” for him to die.
295. Evans v. Alder Hey Children’s Foundation NHS Trust [2018] EWHC 308 (Fam) 
(Eng.).
296.  O. Carter Snead, The Alfie Evans case is straight out of a dystopia, CNN (Apr.
29, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/29/opinions/alfie-evans-opinion-snead/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/4FSF-CLFC]. The Court found additional ethical guidance from the Royal
College of Paediatrics and Child Heath in that “it is no longer in the child’s best interests 
to continue [living]” in those cases “where the severity of the child’s condition is such that
it is difficult or impossible for them to derive benefit from continued life.” Evans v. Alder 
Hey Children’s Foundation NHS Trust [2018] EWHC 308 (Fam).
297. Ponnuru, supra note 153. 
298. Even a critique of the American response to the Alfie Evans story culminates 
in the author admitting that he would have allowed the parents to take Alfie to Rome.
Christodoulou, supra note 221. 
299. Joel Adams, Ashya King cleared of cancer three years after his parents abducted 
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Like with all state involvement, there is an inherent risk of abuse when 
the test for life is left to the government. Where a judiciary has the power 
to deem what disabilities are worth living with, the inherent subjectivity 
of the standard will inevitably lead to inequitable results. The decision of 
whether to pursue treatment, even when it furthers a life of severe physical 
incapacitation, should lie with the guardians of the child in all but extreme 
cases. 
Therefore, an alternate to the best interest test should consider first, the 
level of suffering the patient is experiencing, and second, the autonomy 
of the guardian. The proposed model health code that follows takes into
consideration these two prongs. 
B. Model Health Code: End-of-Life Decisions for Minors 
Courts do not have the authority to supersede the wishes of legal 
guardians to sustain treatment for a minor unless a caregiver requesting to 
withdraw treatment has established with clear and convincing evidence 
that: 
(a) The patient has been proven to be in extreme pain; and 
(b) The treatment is not reasonably expected to lead to a
positive outcome; 
and 
(c) The guardian has been given an opportunity to arrange for 
alternate care;  
and 
(d) No physician or facility has expressed a willingness to
provide treatment to the minor. 
In all other cases, the guardian retains the right to decide the course 
of treatment for the minor. 
In the case where joint guardians disagree on a course of treatment, the 
guardian wishing to sustain care should prevail unless the above prongs 
are satisfied. 
For purposes of this standard, extreme pain refers to physical pain. As 
such, paralysis and other conditions that do not traditionally result in severe 
physical pain will not meet the requisite standard. A positive outcome refers 
to any potential for improvement, regardless of magnitude. 
When a minor, deemed competent and mature of age, expresses an
unwillingness to continue with treatment, that should weigh in favor of the 
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court’s interceding. In all other cases, the wishes of the minor patient will 
not supersede that of the guardian.
Had this standard been applied to either the Charlie Gard or the Alfie
Evans case, the party requesting court intercession surely would not have
met the burden of proof. In both Charlie’s and Alfie’s cases, physicians
admitted that they could not definitively say that either baby was even 
experiencing pain at all, which means the party requesting court intervention
would have failed on the first prong. This differs from Baby Tinslee’s case, 
because medical staff have opined that she is experiencing pain, particularly 
when her medication wears. Under the model code presented, Tinslee’s
guardian would have lost on this prong unless Tinlee’s guardian could present 
evidence to rebut that presented by medical staff. In the case of a dispute
between medical professionals over whether the patient is experiencing 
pain, there would be a thumb on the scale for the evidence presented on behalf 
of the family or guardians.
In applying the second prong of the model code to Alfie and Charlie’s
cases, it is clear that the burden of the caregiver requesting withdrawal
would not be met here either. In both cases, the alternate medical facilities 
who volunteered to treat the children would not have done so had those 
medical facilities thought further treatment was futile. 
The third prong is intended to keep the burden of proof on the caregiver 
wishing to withdraw treatment instead of shifting it to the parent. This prong 
allows the guardians reasonable time to arrange for alternate care after the 
current caregiver has expressed an unwillingness to continue it. The amount 
of time deemed “reasonable” will be decided on a case-by-case basis. 
In terms of the last prong of the Model Code, the guardians of both Alfie 
and Charlie had secured places at other medical facilities willing to treat
them. In Alfie’s case, not only had the Italian government granted him
citizenship301 to facilitate his entry into the country for treatment, it had 
also arranged for a Defense Ministry specially equipped plane to take him 
to the Bambino Gesu. The Bambino Gesu also offered to provide care to
Charlie. It was further made clear that other facilities would be willing to 
take Charlie when the Columbia physician and other medical experts co-
signed a letter opining that treatment could improve Charlie’s brain condition. 
It is unclear whether Tinslee has been offered treatment at another facility; 
301. One way to gain access to treatment abroad may be to renounce the citizenship
of a country refusing treatment in favor of obtaining citizenship in a country willing to 
offer medical treatment. Both Alfie and Charlie were granted new citizenship to expedite
their receiving of treatment in other countries. However, this grant of citizenship ultimately 
proved futile because the British courts refused to recognize it. Thus, as a result of the 
inherent uncertainty in this method, change in citizenship does not appear to be a viable 
option to receive treatment from another country. 
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the staff at her current hospital is claiming she has not, while the family 
and their supporters are claiming she has. 
Another case to consider is the situation where the guardian wishes 
to cease treatment against the recommendation of the treating physician. 
This is similar to the case of Yael Shaefer discussed above. This is a rare 
scenario, and not addressed by the proposed solution in this Comment. 
Because the opposition parties in both Alfie and Charlie’s case would
have failed on all prongs, under the Model Code, the court would have
disallowed itself from interceding and instead it would have deferred to 
the guardians to decide to either withdraw treatment in accordance with 
the recommendations of their current caretakers, or move their child to a 
facility that would treat him. Although it remains to be seen what will come 
out in Tinslee’s appeal, at present, it does not appear that the opposing party 
could necessarily prove each prong with clear and convincing evidence,
and thus, the decision should be left with her guardian to decide whether 
to stop life-sustaining measures or move her to a different facility. 
CONCLUSION 
Relying on this standard, only when the child is provably suffering from 
extreme pain, additional treatment offers no hope for a positive outcome,
the guardian has been given opportunity to search for alternate care, and 
no medical facility is willing to provide treatment to the child, should the 
court intervene on behalf of the opposing party. As long as any one of 
these conditions is not met, courts should give deference to the guardian. 
In addition to implementing this standard, mediation should be prioritized 
before resorting to judicial action, and legislation on experimental treatment, 
advance directives, and do-not-resuscitate orders should be drafted with a 
focus on the autonomy of the guardian. 
The ultimate goals are to give parents across the globe the freedom to
care for disabled or critically ill children and to turn away from the traditional 
concept of “best interest” in its current application, which is inimical to
the goal of providing care and comfort to these children. This shifts the
outcome away from withholding treatment from those who are neither
suffering nor imminently dying merely because their lives have been deemed 
not worth living. By transitioning to a test that better reflects the views of 
the guardian, the chances of that treatment helping a physically dependent 
child will increase. 
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